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Environmental foresight and structural change
M.B. Beck
Warnell School of Forest Resources,University of Georgia, Athens, GA 30602-2152, USA
(mbbeck@ uga.edu)
Abstract: Policy-makers and the public, it has famously been said [Brooks, 1986], are more interested in the
possibility of non-linear dislocations and surprises in the behavior of the environment than in smooth
extrapolations of current trends. How indeed should we design our models to generate environmental
foresight, to detect, in particular, threats to our environment lying “just beyond the horizon”? In facing this
prospect of potentially profound dislocations in behavior, the problem is that the number of state variables in
the model, whether they interact, how they interact, and the form of their interactions, may be evolving over
time. What may have appeared to have been an insignificant mode of behavior in the past — buried within
the uncertainty of the model and the historical data — may come to dominate behavior in the future.
Technically, we may call this a change of structure. The concern of the paper is to address the challenge of
constructing and employing models to generate environmental foresight in the presence of structural change.
A number of case histories, ranging across lake eutrophication, urban ozone levels, the restoration of
ecosystems, the circulation of waters in the North Atlantic, and the invasion of exotic species, are used to
construct a much more immediate sense of the nature of structural change and, therefore, the character of the
challenge of generating environmental foresight. Some mathematical and logical formalities are then
introduced, both to define the issues more sharply and to open up the means with which to address them. This
provides an opportunity to take stock of three rather different programs of model-building used, over the
decades, to generate environmental foresight. We close by illustrating a set of possible responses to the
essential challenge through a number of contemporary case studies: in assessing, inter alia, the reachability
of the lay community’s hopes and fears for the future of their cherished piece of the environment; in
apprehending and diagnosing the possibility of imminent structural change; and in examining the record of
the past for emergence of the seeds of any such structural change.
Keywords: Adaptive control and management; analysis of uncertainty; cultural theory; reachable futures;
recursive estimation; stakeholder futures; surprise; sensitivity analysis; watershed management
1.

INTRODUCTION

Thinking about the future, would one really
imagine the science base as remaining invariant
over the decades now commonly within the reach
of our forecasting horizons? The answer, of
course, is “No, one would not”. Our knowledge is
continually evolving. Yet we must necessarily
invest the structures of the models we use with
invariance. For how, otherwise, could we design a
model in which the “birth”, “death”, or
“extinction” of a state variable, for example, is to
be mimicked [Allen, 1990; Kauffman, 1995]? How
could one discover the rules by which systems
rearrange themselves (the way in which their state
variables interact with each other) and then use
these to make projections into the future? For the
time being, we are going to have to cope with the
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continually evolving knowledge base employing
models remaining squarely in the domain of the
state-space representations of classical mechanics.
They will contain an invariant number of states (x)
and parameters (α) with formal interactions among
them that are just as invariant. In this domain, then,
how should we accommodate the uncertain,
changing nature of the knowledge base, assuming
we believe that the environmental problems we
now face are sensitive to such uncertainty and
change?
This is a rather general, rough hewn block of a
question, however; and we shall not attempt to
answer it — at least, not in its entirety. In order to
make any progress, fragments will have to be
chipped from the block. We first present some case
histories in dealing with the concepts of

trajectories, equilibria, excursions, dislocations and
surprises in the behavior of the environment. Our
purpose is to provide motivation and to develop a
figurative sense of structural change. Some
formalities of a mathematical and logical nature
are then introduced. They are necessary for
specifying more tightly those sub-problems and
sub-questions, to which we may have some chance
of responding through formal computational
analysis. We shall close by illustrating our
responses to date with a number of case studies.
2.

CASE HISTORIES: WHAT EXACTLY
IS THE PROBLEM?

Let us suppose the global system is evolving along
a trajectory. In the past few decades we have
become aware of the way in which the activities of
humans have been sufficient — over the last
couple of centuries or so — to cause the system to
deviate from a trajectory along which it might
otherwise have traveled, had it not been for, say,
the industrial revolution.1 This, then, is our
predicament. As we stand, as we always do, on the
threshold of the future, what is of concern to us
about the environment of our global system?
Because what is of concern to us — how we
conceive of the future in relation to the trajectory
discerned from the past — shapes the character of
the problems to be explored computationally for
the purposes of generating environmental
foresight. It will shape too the direction of our
search into the record of the past.
2.1

Equilibria and Deviations

That our perception is of a trajectory, as opposed
to a temporary deviation away from an
equilibrium, is in itself a conceptual advance
[Holling, 1996]. For the moment, however, let us
think of the trajectory, since it is evolving
relatively slowly (over centuries), as a sequence of
quasi-equilibria spanning relatively short periods
of time (decades).
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The words we use here are fraught with the
difficulties of “loaded” interpretations. For
example, would the global system have
experienced a natural trajectory of evolution in the
absence of man, since man is part of nature?
Without having to put quotation marks around
almost every word, the following is written
without presuming the evolution of the global
system to be necessarily natural in the absence of
man, or unnatural because of his presence and
involvement.
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In the classical domains of water and air pollution,
the concern has been to reverse the imposition of a
stress manifesting itself in a fully developed,
palpable, local (or regional) environmental strain.
In the case of Lake Erie in North America, for
example, cultural eutrophication brought about by
the excessive accumulation of nutrients could be
reversed, in principle, by rectifying the
anthropogenic diversion of these materials from
their natural cycles into the aquatic environment
[Schertzer and Lam, 2002]. From a knowledge of
what Erie had once been like (in living memory),
together with a knowledge of the behavior of
nearby, similar lakes — not similarly stressed,
however — the levers of policy to be pulled and
the desired position to which the system ought then
to return were predictable, by and large. Likewise,
given a knowledge of how ozone is generated in
the atmosphere from emissions of gaseous oxides
of nitrogen (NOX) and volatile organic carbon
(VOC) compounds, the tangible environmental
strain of injurious episodes of high concentrations
of ozone in the air of urban areas could be
predictably reversed [Dennis, 2002].
The record of environmental protection, as it
happens, is not littered with the failures of any
“classical” strategies of prediction and policy
implementation. But there are some case histories
bearing important lessons to be learned, such as
those, for instance, of Schertzer and Lam [2002],
Hornberger [2002] and Dennis [2002]. In
particular, formal, computationally encoded
models have now been used for a sufficiently long
period for this horizon to include significant
evolution in the science base — or, at least,
evolution in those parts of it deemed sufficiently
problem-significant to have been included in the
model. Indeed, let us label such problem-relevant
knowledge as the {presumed known}. By this very
choice of words, it is obvious this {presumed
known} will have a complement, i.e., the
something unknown, or the something judged not
to be problem significant. We shall call this the
{acknowledged unknown}. Clearly, what may
have been consigned to the {acknowledged
unknown} at the time — and therefore omitted
from the model used for prediction and the
formulation of policy (deliberately, unwittingly, or
in ignorance) — may subsequently come into play
in thwarting the complete success of the actions
taken to restore the system to the presumed
trajectory from which it had earlier departed.
Thus, in the eutrophication of Lake Erie the
{presumed known} of the 1960s and 1970s
amounted essentially to the biochemistry of
nutrient assimilation in an ecosystem, not the
{acknowledged unknown} of the hydrodynamics

governing nutrient movement. In the 1980s and
1990s, a mixture of the flaws in the {presumed
known}, which seemed less secure and overly
crude in retrospect, and the growing perception of
the significance of the {acknowledged unknown},
was brought to bear on explaining why the earlier
regulatory actions had failed to relieve the strains
of extended bouts of anoxia in the lake. In the case
of urban ozone episodes, the {acknowledge
unknown} of natural, biogenic emissions of VOCs
in the rural surrounds of the metropolitan centres
came to undermine the success of a regulatory
policy locked firmly onto curtailing emissions of
unnatural, anthropogenic VOCs from urban traffic
— as though wilfully, almost perversely, the only
allowable {presumed known} [Dennis, 2002].
Both of these case histories deal with deviations
from a trajectory unfolding (and being refolded)
over a matter of a few decades — a relatively short
time-scale, within living memory; deviations
furthermore, of broadly predictable properties, all
the foregoing quibbling notwithstanding. Both too
are instances where, for the purposes of
implementing urgent regulatory action at a given
point in time, the formulation of policy had
inevitably to be crystallized around a particular,
crisp image (computational encoding) of the
science base, i.e., the {presumed known}. Such
crystallization is not without its difficulties,
however. The science base, or at least the formal
predictions derived from it, can be in a state of
considerable flux, even over the span of just a few
years, as evidenced by Schneider and Thompson
[1985] in their work on projections of changes in
stratospheric ozone concentrations [see also Beck,
2002]. It would have been easy to have locked the
formation of policy on to the wrong image of the
moment. Yet policy and control there must be,
based on what is deemed the best current image of
the system’s behavior. It would be naïve of us to
suggest this could have been otherwise and
unsurprising for the subsequent auditing of the
actions taken to reveal the rise to significance of
other elements in the evolving knowledge base.
Yet the ethos of model-building in the 1970s and
1980s was to proceed as though the {presumed
known} could be encapsulated in a largely
unchanging model of what would in due course be
revealed as a largely unchanging science base.
2.2

Dislocations and Structural Change

It occurs to us, however, that stresses can induce
something of a more plastic, enduring character,
beyond merely a reversible, elastic strain. The
system, if pushed too much, may not return to its
original “equilibrium”, or, better put, may not
proceed to the position on the trajectory it would
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have reached, had there never been any
anthropogenically induced excursion. It may
instead migrate towards patterns of movement
about another equilibrium [Holling, 1978, 1996],
that is, embark on an altogether different
trajectory. So in looking to the future, we can
become concerned about this: that the behavior of
our environment in the future may come to be
radically different from what we have known in
the past, albeit the relatively recent past. And we
are really rather creative in imagining what these
threats to our environment might be [Leggett,
1996]. Concerns of this kind, we call herein the
modern problems, without suggesting that the
classical problems have somehow been conquered
or rendered irrelevant. They are modern, for the
purposes of our discussion here, in the sense that
they have attributes requiring us to conceive of
schemes of computational exploration beyond the
classical forms of problem-solving in the cases of
eutrophication and ozone just described. Two
examples, both from oceanography and the marine
sciences, illustrate the point — in their own
slightly different ways.
First, there is the aspiration to restore the
ecological systems of the oceans and seas to
something of a quasi-pristine condition. The
difficult question here, of course, is that of what
constitutes this condition, a question subject to
vigorous debate [Jackson, 2001]. To see why, let
us first bring to mind the image of a model as
comprising nodes (the state variables, x) connected
by branches (causal influences underlain by
parameters, α) — in literal terms here, a web of
predator-prey interactions among the various
biological species. To those familiar with
molecular graphics, the web can be thought of as
the three-dimensional image of a complex
compound. With this in mind, today’s dominant
interactions amongst the state variables, with one
subset of emboldened branches, say at time t0,
shows a significantly different (emboldened)
structure from that of times past, in living memory
(t-), let us say.2 Indeed, if the distinction between
emboldened (dominant) and ordinary (minor)
branches in the web is sharply contrasted — so
that only the emboldened branches remain
apparent — we could visualize in the limit a
change of structure in the system, between t- and
t0. This per se is significant. Jackson’s point,
however, is that the historical record (t----),
reaching further back than mere living memory,
would show yet a quite different structure. In other
words, our perception of these ecological systems,
in the Caribbean and North Atlantic, for example,
2

As in Figures 1 and (especially) 2, to be
discussed in more detail later.

is that they have undergone a kind of smooth
evolution over the centuries — arguably, an
excursion from their original trajectory — which
can appear to us as a structural change. The quasiequilibrium of t- is (arguably) not the point to
which the system should be restored; it might
(better) be that of t----.
Strictly speaking, if no species has become extinct
in these marine ecosystems, the number of nodes
in the web has remained unchanged, although the
nature of the interactions between the species may
have changed, and certainly the set of dominant
interactions has changed. We shall refer to this
physical realization of change as an apparent
structural change [Beck, 2002], to distinguish it
thus from the true structural change of evolution
envisaged in Allen [1990]. From the perspective of
using models to generate environmental foresight
— and this is the key — were we able to capture a
description of the entire foodweb, one and the
same structure of a model would suffice for
describing its behavior from t---- (historical past)
through t- (living memory) to t0 (the present) and
on into the near-term future (t+) and well beyond
(t++++). In this, in an all-encompassing, singular
{presumed known}, movement along the
trajectory of the system would be revealed as a
continual structural undulation, of the rising to
significance, and falling into insignificance, of the
various modes of behavior attaching to the
interactions (α) amongst all the known state
variables (x) — apparent structural change of a
kind. If such a singularity cannot be captured, we
would have the apparent structural change of the
sequence of structurally different images of merely
the emboldened interactions at each stage in these
blocks of time, from the past into the future.
Second, there are the ramifications reverberating
from the conceptual insight of the ocean conveyor
belt, as applied to circulation of the waters of the
North Atlantic [Weaver, 1995]. The {presumed
known} of geophysical theory and physical
oceanography in this instance is extensive; so
extensive, in fact, that it was not until the early
1990s that enough of it could be assembled into a
model for practical solution on a computational
platform, in order thus eventually to liberate the
insight of the conveyor belt itself. An ominous
“point of no return” in our potential futures has
thereby been revealed [Weaver, 1995]: a location
on a trajectory (again, perhaps a disturbed
trajectory), which, should the system be pushed
beyond it (by the accumulation of yet further
deviant disturbances), would cause the conveyor
belt eventually to be switched off, for the first time
in living memory, with consequences of
potentially profound significance for the climate of
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north-west Europe. If the insight — the highly
aggregated, high-level conceptual description of
past behavior, extracted from the massive bulk of
the {presumed known} — is not substantially
flawed, it suggests the possibility of radically
different, immensely “hard-to-predict” behavior
arising in the future. The potential environmental
strain is merely incipient; the strain may well be
plastic, far from elastic; and the system, essentially
of global proportions, has no nearby replicates to
serve as reliable benchmarks against which to
gauge the progress of restoration.
We have a sense here, then, of the kind of
nonlinear dislocation of such great concern to us
[Brooks, 1986]. It is change of a different order
indeed to the smoother extrapolations of the
eutrophication and ozone problems, even of the
marine ecological systems of the Caribbean Sea
and North Atlantic Ocean. This, then, is the
problem.
2.3

Surprise

We know that these case histories of
eutrophication and ozone, as related here, map
neatly onto Holling’s concept of engineering
resilience: policy is formed to maintain the system
at a single, fixed equilibrium [Holling, 1996]; and
use of the word “engineering” evokes a sense of
manufactured security and completeness of the
knowledge base (encoded in a model). In turn,
Thompson [1997] has mapped the corresponding
myth of nature, of “Nature benign” in this instance
[Holling, 1986], into one of Cultural Theory’s four
forms of social solidarity (or perspectives on the
man-environment relationship), namely the
Individualists. Theirs is an essentially peril-free
outlook in which the environment is thought
capable of absorbing all insult and injury before
returning assuredly to a pre-disturbance
equilibrium position. Restoration of the marine
ecosystems of the Caribbean and North Atlantic
might map across Holling’s myth of “Nature
perverse but tolerant” into Thompson’s solidarity
of the Hierarchists: restoration to the predisturbance equilibrium will be the norm, for as
long as the environment is not placed under
excessive stress, in which case excursions into the
largely unfamiliar and undesirable will ensue. But
the “point of no return” for the ocean conveyor
belt seems like a phrase conjured up by the
Egalitarians of Cultural Theory, just as much as it
captures the essence of why herein we seek other
means of computational exploration of the future.
“Nature ephemeral”, the myth to which the
Egalitarians are supposed to subscribe, says that
any disturbance, no matter how small, may plunge
the system into the wholly undesirable and

unfamiliar. Ecological resilience, for which
Holling would have us design [Holling, 1996],
would facilitate navigation around and through the
worst of this “undesirable and unfamiliar”, with a
continually receding horizon of foresight.
In classical terms, reducing the uncertainties — in
preparing ourselves to cope with the impacts of
climate change and other structural shifts and
dislocations — has been equated with making a
model so comprehensive ({presumed known}→∞)
as to render the probability of significant structural
change arising out of our ignorance vanishingly
small ({acknowledge unkown}→0). Yet for all the
computational power at our disposal, we are still
surprised by the behavior of our environment. That
is to say [Price and Thompson, 1997]:
A myth of nature provides its holder with a way
of seeing the world [{presumed known}] and
with a way of not seeing it [{acknowledged
unknown}]. This means that if the world
happens not to be the way the myth-holder is
convinced it is, he or she will notice this
discrepancy straight away. Enlightenment,
therefore, is always time-lagged and, since it
results in the enlightened one being tipped out
of one quadrant of the Cultural Theory scheme
and into one of the other three, it comes as
something of a shock: a surprise.3
Surprise, in other words, is always relative,
which explains why, whenever something
unexpected befalls us, there is always someone
who ‘saw it coming’!
The theory of surprise [Thompson and Tayler,
1986; Thompson et al., 1990] is built on this
relativistic, but far from unconstrained,
foundation:
an event is never surprising in itself;
it is potentially surprising only in relation to a
particular set of convictions about how the
world is;
it is actually surprising only if it is noticed by
the holder of that particular set of convictions.
Someone must have seen the invasion of zebra
mussels coming to Lake Erie and the other Great
Lakes; certainly, these exotic creatures have acted
as a policy-confounding feature [Schertzer and
Lam, 2002]. Their abundance, and the consequent
highly effective removal of phosphorus from these
3

“Quadrant” implies four solidarities, the fourth
being the Fatalists, who believe the myth of
“Nature capricious”, i.e., that nature will do what it
chooses irrespective of man’s behavior.
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waters, has wrought a distortion in the foodweb
now deemed excessive; so excessive, in fact, as to
give credence to the idea of augmenting the inflow
of nutrients to the lake. That would overturn three
decades of policy; and this would be surprising, to
many of us. It is as though a new atom (an exotic
species) were inserted into a recognizably stable
and coherent molecule (ecosystem). Thereafter, the
molecular graphic (the visualization of our
computational model) would be animated, as the
collection of nodes bounce around within the
resulting looseness of their elastic attachments in
response to the invader, just as they have done in
several aquatic ecosystems in the northen United
States [for example, Strayer et al, 1999; Matthews
et al, 2002] — a physical manifestation of
structural change. The system never quite returns
to the location it might otherwise have attained on
any pre-ordained trajectory.
3.

MATHEMATICAL AND LOGICAL
FORMALITIES

Our essential question is this: how should we go
about generating environmental foresight while
acknowledging the evolving nature of the
knowledge base of primary science, manifest as
apparent structural change in the computational
encoding of a model? We must now introduce
some formalities of models, thus to break this
general question into a number of more specific,
albeit no more markedly tractable, questions.
3.1

Constructing the Space Between the
Model and the (Unknowable) Truth

Many models of the behavior of environmental
systems can be defined according to the following
(lumped-parameter) representation of the state
variable dynamics of classical mechanics,
dx(t)/dt = f{x,u,α;t} + ξ(t)

(1a)

with observed outputs being defined as follows,
y(t) = h{x,α;t} + η(t)

(1b)

in which f and h are vectors of nonlinear functions,
u, x, and y are the input, state, and output vectors,
respectively, α is a vector of model parameters, ξ
and η are notional representations respectively of
those attributes of behavior and output observation
that are not to be included in the model in specific
form, and t is continuous time. Should it be
necessary, spatial variability of the system’s state
can be assumed to be accounted for by, for
example, the use of several state variables of the
same attribute of interest at the several defined
locations.

For any system, the choices of [u,y] determine the
(observable) external description of its behavior,
to be labeled as B. Those aspects of the science
base mobilized into the computational encoding of
the model — the hypothetical mechanisms
considered significant to the manner in which
input, causative disturbances (u) are transcribed
into output effects (y) — are signaled by the
choices of [f,h;x,α]. In short, the structure of
model is most succinctly conveyed in terms of
[f,h], which denote the logical inter-connections
among u, x, and y, while α signifies
parameterization of the particular mathematical
expressions of all the hypothetical mechanisms
believed to underpin these interactions. We may
call [x,α] the internal description of the system’s
behavior, as the complement of [u,y].
In “truth”, then, the structure of the system’s
behavior can be supposed to be of (almost)
infinitely high order, but invariant.4 Let us denote
this as [f ∞,h∞]. We, with our models in the realm
of the finite, [f 0,h0] say, work on a much more
macroscopic plane. Our models have a crude
resolving power, even for those of a very high
order (+n), with structure [f +n,h+n]. As the
behavior of the system moves along a trajectory
through time, certain of its myriad features may
dominate affairs for a while, while others may be
dominant over other periods. It may appear to us as
though the structure of the system’s behavior is
varying with time, i.e., that for a while we would
characterize this as [f 0,h0;t--] and over another
period as [f 0,h0;t-], or even as [f i,hi] during t-- but
[f j,hj] during t- (as seemingly manifest in the
behavior of an ecological system before and after
invasion by exotic species). All the fine-grained
flutter and drift are lost imperceptibly — for a
while — in the gap between what is included in the
model, [f 0,h0], and the truth of the matter, [f ∞,h∞].
With progress over the decades in the knowledge
bases of the primary sciences, the tendency is in
general for [f 0,h0] to grow incrementally towards
[f +n,h+n], arguably with an accompanying sense of
closing in on the truth.5
4

In the absence of evolution that is, in particular,
absent the birth of a truly novel species, which
would constitute a state variable emerging from
“somewhere outside” the vector x and requiring
logically thereafter to be inserted into it.
5
There is a difference, of course, between what we
can encode (hypothetically) on the computer and
the actual nature of things; and not in all subjects is
there inexorable growth in the order of the models
being employed in the everyday practice of science
(the case of understanding surface water
acidification is one such example; Beck [2002]).
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What exactly, however, should we suppose is the
content of the gap between [f 0,h0] and [f ∞,h∞], the
structural error in the model, that is? Put simply,
this inadequacy, or approximation, may enter into
equation 1 through α, ξ, and η, although these
points of entry differ in their interpretation and
significance. The principal distinction is between
α, embedded within the choices for [x,α,f,h],
which signify that which we presume (or wish) to
know of the system's behavior, relative to the
purpose of the model, and [ξ,η], which
acknowledge in some form that which falls outside
the scope of what we believe we know. The
difference between the two is as the difference
between what we have called above, respectively,
the {presumed known} and the {acknowledged
unknown}. Much, of course, must be subsumed
under the latter, that is, under the definitions of ξ
and η. We may have chosen to exclude from the
model some of that which was known beforehand,
but which was judged not to be significant; there
may be features for which there are no clear
hypotheses (and therefore no clear mathematical
expressions), other than that these may in part be
stochastic processes with presumably quantifiable
statistical characteristics; there may be yet other
features of conceivable relevance, but of which we
are simply ignorant; and, as is most familiar, there
may be factors affecting the processes of
observation such that we are unable to have
uncorrupted, perfect access to knowledge of the
values of the inputs, states, or outputs.
Essentially, the model is all that we have to work
with to cope with the gap between [f 0,h0] and
[f ∞,h∞], where this gap will constitute the whole of
the {acknowledged unknown} and of the
{presumed known} being wrongly presumed
known. It is all we have to apprehend something of
significance, to our understanding and actions,
within the gap. In particular, in this process of
apprehension, the model — being the vessel
containing all the relevant hypothetical knowledge
from the science base — is to be pitted against all
the relevant experience of observed past and, most
importantly (as we shall see), imagined future
behavior, collectively symbolized as B(t----), B(t-),
B(t+), B(t++++), for example. In short, our original
question can be restated in a more formal, but
interim, manner as:
Given a model of fixed structure [f 0,h0], and
given descriptions of behavior over time,
B(t----), B(t-), B(t+), B(t++++), how should we use
the model to cope with, even apprehend, the
very high likelihood of changes in time of
significance to our understanding and actions in

the space between [f 0,h0] and the truth of the
matter, namely [f ∞,h∞]?
3.2

Probing the Constructed Space

For several years, handling an apparent change of
structure — from [f 0,h0; t--] to [f 0,h0;t-] — was
accommodated through an immutable structure
[f 0,h0] populated with parameters that were
permitted to change with time, i.e., through the
device of α(t--) migrating to α(t-) [see, for example,
Beck, 1987]. But this is not entirely satisfactory as
a description of the nature of the gap, as we now
appreciate. It addresses merely the issue of the
{presumed known} being in error, using the
elements of the parameter vector α as tags. In other
words the {presumed known} can be
parameterized as {presumed known (α)} in order
to identify more specifically the inadequacies of
the model’s constituent hypotheses, as revealed
through those reconstructed estimates of the
parameters found to change (significantly) with
time. This does not cater for the need to detect
changes of significance – not of pure chance – in
the {acknowledged unknown}. Yet ξ and η are
fictions, mere labels for the divergence between
the presumed known content of the model and the
unknowable truth. They are not computable from
the givens of our question above. We need
therefore to find a tractable means of probing the
nature of the {acknowledged unknown}, no matter
how approximate this might be.
To this end, as a first approximation, consider how
we actually put a model to work. We compose the
model ([f 0,h0]), attempt to reconcile it with past
observed behavior (B(t-)), use it to predict future
behavior, and, when that behavior becomes
manifest (as B(t+)), reconsider the model’s
formulation and proceed to the next round of
prediction. Whether known as adaptive
environmental assessment and management
[Holling, 1978], or more narrowly as adaptive
control in engineering systems [Åström and
Wittenmark, 1989], these principles constitute
what we may call a recursive, predictive working
environment: with thoughts trained on a future
with an ever receding forecasting horizon as we
pass through time. We can place our model of
equation 1 formally into this framework, putting it
in fact into the naturally recursive format of what
is called an innovations representation of the
system’s behavior, as follows:
dx(t|tk-1)/dt = f{x(t|tk-1),u(t),α} + Kε(t|tk-1)
y(tk) = h{x(tk|tk-1),α} + ε(tk|tk-1)

Here attention has been restricted merely to the
conventional intervals of time passing from one
observing instant tk-1 to the next, tk. In spite of the
formalities, what is of importance will prove to be
of conceptual, as much as algorithmic,
significance. Thus, formally, the argument (t|tk-1)
signals a predicted value of the associated quantity
at some (future) time t utilizing the model and all
observed information, in particular, in respect of
the observed output y, up to and including that
available at the most recent sampling instant, tk-1.
ε(tk|tk-1) is the innovation, i.e., the mismatch
between the predicted and observed values of the
output at the next sampling instant in discrete time,
tk, in equation 2(b); ε(t|tk-1) in equation 2(a) is the
value of this quantity at times not coincident with
the sampling instant. K is a weighting matrix and
can be thought of as a device for distributing the
impacts of the innovations among the constituent
representations of the various state variable
dynamics, i.e., the representations fi{·} for each
state xi. K is central to the conceptual argument we
now present.
First of all, comparing equations 1 and 2, it is
evident that the cleavage in the one, between the
{presumed known} and the {acknowledged
unknown}, is as that between [f,h] and [ξ,η] (in
equation 1), while in the other (equation 2) it is as
that between [f,h] and [Kε,ε]. Second, unlike ξ and
η, ε(tk|tk-1) is a computable quantity, being the
mismatch (in equation 2(b)) between the forecast
value of the output and the observed output —
albeit not the truth of the matter (hence some of the
necessary approximation in our argument).6 In this
way, ε is a kind of gauge of the foregoing gap
between [f 0,h0] and [f ∞,h∞]. Third, just as we are
familiar with the notion of reconciling the model’s
behavior with that observed of the real thing, in
order to adjust and estimate the values of the
model’s conventional parameters (α), so this same
process of reconciliation can be employed to
reconstruct values for the elements (κ, say) of the
matrix K. Indeed, the original motivation for the
algorithmic form of equation 2 was precisely this:
to reconstruct κ, instead of setting their values by
prior assumption, in order to reconstruct estimates
of α [Ljung, 1979]. If then the estimates of κ
remain essentially the same as their prior,
presumed values of 0.0, none of the empirical
mismatches between the model and the data — in
effect the innovations ε — are fed back into the
6

(2a)
(2b)
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Further, assumptions will have to be made as to
how the computed value of ε from equation 2(b) is
technically to be treated within equation 2(a), but
this is literally a technical matter of no great
significance for the conceptual argument being
made.

predictions made of future behavior. Our
predictive instrument is operating essentially on
the basis of the {presumed known} alone. Should
the elements of κ come to be reconstructed in the
course of events as substantially non-zero, our
predictive instrument is beginning to rely on the
{acknowledged
unknown},
and
perhaps
exclusively so.
Armed with these three conceptual interpretations
of the formalities of equation 2, we can proceed to
our vital insight into the role of K. Given the
association of [Kε,ε] with the {acknowledged
unknown}, κ can be attached to the
parameterization of this entity in the same manner
as α has been the device for parameterizing the
{presumed known}. We have thus the {presumed
known (α)} and {acknowledged unknown (κ)},
where now, given the computability of ε, we have
an empirical means of both identifying the
inadequacies of what has been included in the
model and apprehending something of significance
in what has been excluded from it. Further, as with
all the individual elements of α, what transpires in
reconstructing the individual elements of κ can
provide pointers to the specific consequences of
this “something of significance” — something of
substance in guiding the search for the reasons
underlying the apparent structural change.
Alternatively, think of it as follows. Randomness
in the gap between [f 0,h0] and [f ∞,h∞] should
cause flutter in ε, possibly even of high amplitude
(for example, from the spurious corruption of
observing errors). Persistent mismatches of
significance in ε should eventually cause
adaptation and change within α and κ, the one
pointing to structural errors in the expression of the
{presumed known}, the other to something of
significance
being
apprehended
in
the
{acknowledged unknown}.
3.3

what is more, should direct our attention into
specific avenues for discovery of the source of the
anomalies, through the tagging devices of α and κ.

Figure 1. Archetypal branch-node network
structure of a model, as a metaphor for problem
construction and problem-solving: nodes represent
state variables (x); branches connecting states with
states are associated with the model’s parameters
(α); branches extending into the space around the
structure are associated with the elements (κ) of
the matrix K in equation 2.
To conclude, then, our original question, and its
earlier, more formal, interim expression, can be
restated more precisely as follows:
Given a model of fixed structure [f 0,h0], given
the parameterizations of the {presumed known
(α)} and {acknowledged unknown (κ)}, and
given descriptions of behavior over time,
B(t----), B(t-), B(t+), B(t++++), how should we use
the model to cope with the very high likelihood
of changes in time of significance to our
understanding and actions in the space between
[f 0,h0] and the truth of the matter, namely
[f ∞,h∞]?
One could re-phrase this through yet another
metaphor:

Metaphors and the Essential Challenge

Figuratively (and approximately), the structure of
the model has been parameterized by the branches
of the network of Figure 1 — an essential visual
metaphor [Beck, 2002]. The [αij] are included
within the basic rectangular frame connecting the
states (x) with each other, while the [κij] attach to
the frame but point outwards symbolically into the
space surrounding the structure of the frame.
Figuratively, oscillation and/or deformation of the
branches of Figure 1 should alert us to something
being amiss in our understanding. The template of
the model structure ([f 0,h0]) has caught on
something of significance in the space of all the
possibilities around it, as it is being navigated
through the given behavior (B) of the real system.
The indications from engagement between the two,
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As we navigate over the unfolding terrain of
perceived actual behavior, along a particular
heading for the vehicle of Figure 1, what
combination of radar and vehicle must we
design in order to apprehend (detect) threats to
our environment lying beyond the horizon?
To some extent this echoes our original metaphor,
of the global system evolving along a trajectory,
and we, with our models, are interested in
identifying that trajectory — especially its future
course, beyond our direct line of sight, and while
the ground on which we are standing (the science
base) is changing under our feet. But that is to
offer too many metaphors, perhaps, hence to

confuse rather than clarify. We must also issue a
disclaimer. The value of these metaphors — and
indeed the formal, algorithmic arguments from
which they have been extracted — resides in their
capacity for unraveling problems of some
considerable complexity in order (ourselves) to
comprehend these problems. All metaphors will be
limited in their usefulness in a literal sense.
Moreover, we are not literally envisaging
application of the associated recursive algorithms
in order to resolve the more specific problems
thereby revealed.
4.

SOME CHALLENGES: TO WHICH
WE HAVE A POTENTIAL TO
RESPOND

(vi) Can we make useful forecasts of possible
behavior patterns in the face of these
extrapolated dislocations?
(vii) And how should we design regulatory policies
for minimizing the reachability of feared
future states while maximizing the
reachability of desired states?
Yet even these are still not trivial questions; and
they will need further sculpting before we can set
them up formally as tractable computational
problems (subsequently in section 5).
4.1

The whole of this concern is not trivial. It remains
both abstract and recalcitrant — all the metaphors
notwithstanding — too monolithic to attack, as a
whole. We might have a greater chance of
responding to the following, then, as fragments
chipped away from the whole:
(i) Given the lay person’s apprehension at the
prospect of surprises and qualitative
dislocations
in
future
scenarios
of
environmental change — in particular,
apprehension amongst those belonging to the
richly creative Egalitarian social solidarity of
Cultural Theory [Thompson, 1997] — how
can the science base be mobilized in order to
explore the plausibility of these hopes and
fears for the future?
(ii) In the presence of gross uncertainty, what are
the key constituent hypotheses about the
system's behavior, i.e., what are the key model
mechanisms, on which the reachability of
these surprises might turn — for we had better
start purchasing more science in these
particular domains as a priority?
(iii) Is the system in imminent danger of a major
dislocation which would lead to a feared
pattern of future behavior?
(iv) Is there any evidence in the narrow window of
the empirical record to suggest that the system
may already have embarked upon a path of
collapse into a feared future; can we identify
and diagnose the seeds of any imminent
change in this record of the past?
(v) Can we design our models with the express
purpose of discovering our ignorance, and at
the earliest possible moment?
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Programs of Exploration and Enquiry

This issue (of coping with structural change) is
more subtle than merely waiting for larger
computational platforms on which to mount ever
larger models, or of merely accounting for more
uncertainty in all its myriad dimensions. For
consider this, as a caricature of what has been,
over the decades, the primary program for
generating environmental foresight:
(i) Program (1): Include in the model everything
of conceivable relevance; in particular,
maximize use of the Laws of Physics in this
composition; maximize thus the number of
constants (parameters, coefficients) that are
either universally known or measurable,
independently, in the field or laboratory;
minimize thereby the freedom arbitrarily to
adjust the parameterization of the model in the
light of the observed behavior of the
prototype; juxtapose the output of the model
with this empirical evidence; and make a
singular (deterministic) prediction.
Driven in pursuit of the goal of achieving the
{acknowledged unknown (κ)} →0, with the
strongly implied concomitant of the {presumed
known (α)} →∞, the accompanying objective is
that of the search for immutable invariance in the
parameters (α) — in part through the successive
elimination of any need for κ. This seems an
illusion; but it is one to which we are all drawn in
an unending quest. This is not a program to be
abandoned. Yet it is not a program without flaws
[Shackley et al, 1998], not the least of which is that
of mounting an empirical program to secure the
unimaginably extensive B against which to
reconcile gargantuan mobilizations of theory —
without ambiguity [Beck, 2002].7

7

Not to mention the work of Oreskes [1998], in
which it is argued that “predictive power is itself a
fallible judge of scientific knowledge”.

Thus caricatured, Program (1) does not formally
admit uncertainty into its framework. Such
admission is defining for Program (2):
(ii) Program (2): Acknowledge the uncertainty
attaching to the set of prior model concepts
and the empirical record of observed behavior;
presume therein that the parameters of the
model are constants, but not known precisely;
in the process of reconciling observed and
estimated system responses, employ the past
observations to adjust and quantify the
uncertainty attaching to the model, i.e., to its
constituent parameters; and make an ensemble
of predictions that are therefore intrinsically
uncertain.
Everything is uncertain, to some degree. Arguably,
only in the limit of reaching the truth of the matter,
i.e., [f ∞,h∞], could uncertainty be said to have been
eliminated. Much of the intent of this second
program, however, has always been more
pragmatic, very mindful of the metaphysics of this
limit. Models are employed in the service of
making decisions. If the preferred course of action
remains so, in spite of all the uncertainty and all
the analyses of the sensitivity of the decision to
this uncertainty, what does it matter if the model’s
predictions are uncertain? What does it matter,
then, if these uncertain predictions have been
generated from an uncertain model, reflecting an
ineradicable ambiguity in the capacity of the
science base to explain past behavior? Stated thus,
of course, it could mistakenly be argued that the
two programs — in their entireties — have
different objectives. Their common cause is this:
the unending quest of Program (1) becomes the
pursuit of eliminating uncertainty in the
parameterization (α) of the {presumed known} in
Program (2). The uncertainty in α becomes the
logical link between the ever limited capacity to
characterize past behavior — the fingerprint of any
and all the distortions wrought in the structure of
the model as it is reconciled with this observed
behavior — and the making of uncertain
projections therefrom into the future [Beck and
Halfon, 1991]. The program, in fact, entertains the
notion of multiple candidate parameterizations (j),
i.e., α ij , set within multiple candidate model
structures (i), i.e., [f i,hi] [Beven, 2002]. Each of
these parameterizations of α, nevertheless, is
almost universally presumed to be a realization of
a random variable that remains fundamentally
invariant with time.
Caricatures are what they are. They do not
encapsulate everything about the subject. They
exaggerate certain features, here for the purposes
of setting out the heritage of something we may
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now define as a third program of modeling the
behavior of the environment:
(iii) Program (3): Derive qualitative statements
about possible future patterns of behavior
from
systematic
organization
and
manipulation of current (non-quantitative)
beliefs; acknowledge that the model's
parameters are the focal points in a map of the
scientific partial knowns and unknowns about
the behavior of the system; presume that these
parameters will, in general, change with time;
assess the candidate parameterizations and
parametric changes enabling the given futures
to be reached; and direct interpretation of the
observations of past behavior in the light of
performing this predictive task.
Put another way, the goal of Program (3) is the
development of an approach and a set of methods
that will enable us to examine the record of the
past in a manner guided expressly by prior
contemplation of the reachability of certain feared
patterns of future behavior. The intent is to
contribute to the process of generating
environmental foresight [Science Advisory Board,
1995], albeit in literally a round-about manner,
using a rear-view mirror to complement
Schellnhuber’s [1999] forward-view mirror, which
he defines as “contemplation of the future by
reflection on the past”.
A model may be constructed for a variety of
purposes: (i) as a succinctly encoded archive of
contemporary knowledge; (ii) as an instrument of
prediction (in support of making a decision or
formulating a policy); (iii) as an exploratory
vehicle for discovery of our ignorance; and (iv) as
a device for communicating scientific notions to a
scientifically lay audience. These do not map
neatly one-to-one onto the three programs of
modeling. But we can see the evolution of purpose
through (i) through (iii) as we pass over the three
programs. Above all, the third program is about
models as exploratory vehicles for the discovery of
our ignorance. Traveling along a parallel path,
then, we can look back to see how characterization
of the parameters (α) has shifted: from an
invariant, precisely known constant, bestowing
thereby absolute rigidity on the structure of the
model; through parameters as random variables,
allowing thus a degree of random vibrational play
to enter into a structure, which yet manifestly
retains a recognizably constant overall form; and
on to parameters as stochastic processes, where
now the structure may undergo plastic
deformations into almost unrecognizably different
forms and shapes (as we have imagined earlier as a

result of the invasions of exotic species into an
ecosystem).
We have no intention herein of getting caught on
the horns of the hoary tension between dogmatic
preferences for the large and comprehensive — the
higher-order models (HOMs),[ f +n,h+n] — and the
small and “statistical”, the lower-order models
(LOMs), [f -n,h-n], that is. Addressing our concern
needs all the richness of variety of perspective that
can be brought to bear on it, part of which
admittedly requires that models of such vastly
different scope can ultimately be compared on
much the same plane, which in turn is technically
not a simple matter to achieve [Young and
Parkinson, 2002]. There are bigger battles to be
fought.

here members of the Egalitarian social solidarity of
Cultural Theory [Thompson, 1997] — will have
richly creative imaginations, regarding what may
go wrong with the cherished piece of the
environment (Lake Lanier, in our case). Assuming
we have vehicles for encouraging expression inter
alia of these barely plausible, possibly bizarre,
surprising futures (both feared and hoped for) in as
varied and variegated a formal statement of
B(t++++) as possible [Beck et al , 2002c; Varis,
2002], does the relevant science base endorse or
undermine their plausibility? More formally, the
following may be hewn from the rough block of
our primal, essential, motivating question:
Given a high-order model (HOM) of fixed
structure [f +n,h+n], given the parameterization
of essentially just the {presumed known (α)}
alone, and given (lay) stakeholder-authored
descriptions of behavior over future time
B(t++++), establish the plausibility of such
behavior coming to pass, and identify the
subset of key parameters (αK) on which the
reachability of B(t++++) appears likely to turn.

Last, withdrawal of the present (t0) from of our
grand concerns — as the dividing line between
past and future behavior, collectively expressed
above as B(t----), B(t-), B(t+), B(t++++) — is also
significant, as we shall now see in the case studies
to follow.
5.
5.1

CASE STUDIES
Reachable Futures

Our first case study concerns a man-made
impoundment, Lake Lanier, on the Chattahoochee
River just to the north of Atlanta, Georgia, in the
south-eastern United States [Beck et al, 2002c].
The lake is located in a rapidly urbanizing area,
serves several purposes (power generation, water
supply, recreation, wastewater assimilation), and
its quality — or ecological integrity — is a matter
of hotly debated interest to many stakeholders
from a variety of backgrounds. The intensity of
development in this particular conurbation can be
gauged by the fact that a wastewater treatment
plant, whose price might ordinarily have been
some $60M, has been constructed at a cost of
$260M — because one of the local counties not
only draws it water supply from Lanier, but is
facing the prospect of returning its reclaimed water
back to Lanier. In short, since its creation (in 1958)
the lake has received substantial amounts of
nutrients from its surrounding watershed, most of
which (it is believed) are “locked” in the bed of the
lake’s sediments. The lake is seemingly about to
be engulfed by peri-urban development. There is a
palpable fear for the lake’s future [Cowie, 2001];
that things cherished today may not obtain 25
years hence.
Here then is the challenge. Ordinary people are
concerned about the future, even over the longer
term. Some of them — perhaps most interestingly
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Two futures were cultivated for Lanier, in fact: a
desired, Bd(t++++), and a feared future, Bf(t++++)
[Cowie, 2001; Osidele, 2001]. The science base of
the lake’s foodweb was encoded into a model with
some 13 states (x) and 100 or so parameters (α)
[Osidele, 2001; Osidele and Beck, 2002],8 and the
two — stakeholder imagination and scientific
theory — reconciled through an algorithmic
procedure combining regionalized sensitivity
analysis [RSA; Spear and Hornberger, 1980], treestructured density estimation [TSDE; Spear et al,
1994], and uniform covering by probabilistic
rejection [UCPR; Klepper and Hendrix, 1994]. In
familiar terms, suffice it to say there are therein
various mechanizations of Monte Carlo simulation,
i.e., random sampling of the parameter space, with
the means to discriminate those parameters
deemed redundant (αR) from those deemed to be
key (αK) to determining whether or not behavior
(B(t++++)) is thereby obtained.
Establishing the plausibility of the stakeholderauthored futures can be approached through two
measures: (i) the simple ratio of the number of
randomly generated candidate parameterizations
giving the behavior, relative to the total number of
samples; and (ii) the fraction of the total volume of
the sampled parameter space containing the most
dense clustering of behavior-giving candidate
parameterizations. The former, it will be noted, is
8

We acknowledge this is hardly a HOM by many
people’s standards; it is, nevertheless, of a high
order relative to what is discussed below.

cast in terms of the external description of the
system, while the latter attaches to its internal
description. Our findings, on both accounts, are
that the desired future, Bd(t++++), appears some two
to four times more likely to come to pass than the
feared future, Bf(t++++), all the gross uncertainty
surrounding
the
computational
analysis
notwithstanding [Osidele, 2001; Osidele and Beck,
2002]. The ratio of total phosphorus to total
suspended solids in the lake’s tributary inflow, and
the maximum intrinsic growth rate and recruitment
rate constants for fish, are key parameters with
respect to reachability of Bf(t++++). The tributary
phosphorus/particulate
ratio
(again),
fish
recruitment rate (again), and the coefficient for
phosphorus diffusion across the sediment-water
interface in the lake, are key to Bd(t++++) being
attained.
5.2

gross uncertainty of the problem context
notwithstanding, once again). Put simply, if
meeting the regulatory behavior were urgent, more
science had better be purchased in the domain of
sediment-water interactions, as a priority. For there
are not the funds to push forward on all the
scientific fronts associated with the many other
constituent hypotheses parameterised through
αR(t++++).

Identifying Priorities for Purchasing
More Science

Our second case study, of the much smaller Lake
Oglethorpe in Georgia, was conducted as a nursery
prototype of the foregoing Lanier study [Beck et
al, 2002a]. The environmental and social settings
of the problem are not radically different from
those of Lanier, but our challenge will be posed
somewhat differently:
Given an HOM of fixed structure [f +n,h+n],
given the parameterization of essentially just
the {presumed known (α)} alone, and given
descriptions of behavior over time B(t-) and
B(t++++), identify and reflect upon the
significance of change over time in the subsets
of key parameters, αK(t-) and αK(t++++), on
which the reachability of B(t-) and B(t++++),
respectively, appears likely to turn.
Figure 2 shows a summary of the outcomes of our
computational articulation of this problem [Beck et
al, 2002b]. In this instance, target future behavior
B(t++++) is a fairly straightforward expression of
what should be expected of the lake from a
regulatory perspective (arguably, therefore, from
the perspective of the Hierarchist social solidarity
of Cultural Theory). The ecosystem model
contains nine state variables, as denoted by the
nine nodes in the branch-node network diagrams
of Figure 2. Within that structure, dominance —
the emboldened branches — can be seen to shift
from the nutrient-autotroph-herbivore sub-web,
αK(t-) (Figure 2(a)), to the sediment-nutrientautotroph sub-web, αK(t++++) (Figure 2(b)). Over
time, between past and future, the significance of
interactions with the herbivores has declined,
while that of the interactions with the sediment has
risen, from insignificance to significance (all the
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Figure 2. A form of apparent structural change
(Lake Oglethorpe, Georgia): (a) key parameters
({αK(t-)}; emboldened branches) associated with
past behavior attach primarily to the nutrientautotroph-herbivore sub-web; (b) key parameters
({αK(t++++)}; emboldened branches) associated
with future behavior attach primarily to the
sediment-nutrient-autotroph sub-web.
If we had been unaware of the complete web of
interactions, by not engaging it in the structure of
the model, the shift from one to the other of the
networks of merely emboldened branches in
Figure 2 would have appeared to us an evolution,
or dislocation, in the structure of the system’s
behavior (just as in the changes in the Caribbean
Sea and North Atlantic chronicled by Jackson
[2001]). Figure 2 demands a rather more subtle
interpretation,
however.
In
our
formal
compositions of the challenges of both the Lanier
and Oglethorpe case studies, no mention has been
made of the {acknowledged unknown}. The
approach to addressing these challenges presumes
the analyst will, in general, seek to encode as much
of the science base as possible in the model —

what we believe to be the knowns, the partial
knowns, perhaps even speculation about the
unknowns [Beck et al, 2002a]. The distinction
between what is crisply and boldly hypothesized as
“known” and what is speculatively the form of the
“unknown”, is somewhat indistinct. This has more
to do with the mechanization of the problemsolving approach, however, than any display of the
presumption that as the {presumed known}→∞ so
the {acknowledged unknown}→0. It may be
helpful, therefore, to conceive of the structural
shift in Figure 2 as follows. There are always
microscopic flutter and drift in the behavior of the
system, below the resolving power of the model
(or outside its scope). Whereas such flutter and
drift are always present, macroscopic behavior,
nevertheless, might not previously (t-) have been
influenced by it to any significant extent; the point
is, it may well become so, over t++++. Dislocation is
perceived as change over time in the extent to
which behavior is sensitive to the various elements
in the model’s assembly of constituent hypotheses
[Chen and Beck, 2002].
5.3

Parametric Change as the Agent of
Control

As we stand in the present, on the threshold of the
future, it is of great interest to us to know whether
something is about to turn upwards or downwards.
Formally, we have this challenge to face:
Given a model of fixed structure [f 0,h0], given
the parameterization of essentially just the
{presumed known (α)} alone, and given
descriptions of behavior over time B(t-) and
B(t+), determine what changes with time in α,
i.e., α(t) over the interval of time [t- ≤ t ≤ t+] —
in particular, more narrowly focused in the
vicinity of the present t0 — are required to
transfer the state of system from display of
behavior B(t-) to that of B(t+).
There is no case study with which to respond to
this, as yet. But we have a method in mind, now to
be outlined, and can fashion a worthy
computational problem from the Lanier and
Oglethorpe studies.
A generic description of a system’s behavior (such
as equation 1) has inputs u, states and parameters
[x,α], and output responses, y. For simplicity, let
us assume there is essentially no difference
between x and y; target future behaviour (B(t+))
can be specified in terms of either, i.e., as x f(t+).
In general, some of the inputs may be considered
disturbances simply impinging upon the system
and beyond our manipulation, while others are
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quantities whose values we can choose at will,
which we call controls. Control theory concerns
itself with answering the question: what pattern of
controls (u) over some span of time will transfer
the state from its present given value to another
desired value, subject to appropriate assumptions
about the nature of the model’s parameters (α).
Method upon method is available for solving this
problem; and solutions may look like the trajectory
in Figure 3 [Taylor, 1993], for the (input) fossil
fuel flux required to stabilize atmospheric carbon
dioxide concentration at some target level x f(t+)
by the year 2300. Our challenge transposes certain
features within the archetypal question of control
theory, to ask: first, what pattern of variations of α
over time will bring about some specified change
in the state of the system, subject to appropriate
assumptions about the nature of the inputs (u);
and, then, what methods from control theory might
be available to deliver an answer [see Keesman,
2002]? Parametric change has thus become, in
principle, the agent of control.
Within the HOM of the Lanier case study it turns
out that a knowledge of the coefficient for
phosphorus diffusion across the sediment-water
interface (α), for example, is crucial to reaching
the desired domain of behavior in the future, but
nothing more specific is known about the behavior
of this parameter over time. Suppose, for the
purposes of this thought experiment, that the
striped bass population is to be maintained at some
level, x f(t+), that we can assume an array of
watershed development scenarios and policy
controls (u), i.e., that they are in some sense
“known”, and that the structure of the model is of
but modest scope, as conveyed by [f 0,h0]. We
imagine, in Figure 4, it is not beyond the scope of
the existing methods of control theory — for a
modestly sized model — to generate the sequence
of parametric changes, ...,α(tk-1), α(tk), α(tk+1), ...,
required to transfer the status of the striped bass
population over time from x p(t-) to x f(t+). In
particular, once given the anchoring device of a
future destination for behavior, some indication of
the nature of the changes in α to be sought in the
vicinity of the present (t0), including the empirical
evidence of the recent past, is thereby revealed. In
other words, pointers as to the specific nature of
the seeds of any imminent structural change can be
extracted. We would thus have been provoked into
looking into the record of the past from a specific
perspective,
conditioned
upon
having
contemplated what it might take to attain a
particular form of behavior in the future.

Figure 3. Estimated CO2 fluxes from various sources required to follow four IPCC scenarios for atmospheric
CO2 concentration; results computed from the ANU-BACE model (reproduced with permission from Taylor
[1993]).

Figure 4. Putting a so-called principle of model-based predictive control [see Keesman, 2002] to work
(conceptually) in solving the problem of computing those changes of the parameter values (α) required to
transfer the state of the system (denoted as x) from its near-past/present position x p(t-) to some desired future
position x f(t+).
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5.4 Detecting the Seeds of Change: Elastoplastic Deformation of Structure
Our fourth case study examines interference from
the {acknowledge unknown} in the workings of
the {presumed known} — from the putative
existence of a population of phytoplankton (small
organisms at the base of the aquatic foodweb)
capable of intervening in the processes whereby
easily degradable, waste organic matter is
assimilated in a river, with or without damage to
the health of that river’s ecology. This will be our
only challenge containing consideration merely of
that which is retrospective, without any specific
outlook on the future:
Given a model of fixed structure [f 0,h0], given
the parameterizations of the {presumed known
(α)} and {acknowledged unknown (κ)}, and
given a description of behavior over time B(t-),
where the block of time t- is defined by
[t0 ≤ t ≤ tN], reconstruct estimates of changes
α(t) and κ(t) in order to identify pointers to the
nature of our ignorance in the space between
[f 0,h0] and the truth of the matter, namely
[f ∞,h∞].

a reliance on the {presumed known} to a reliance
on the {acknowledged unknown}. That all three
reconstructed estimates in Figure 5 remain
relatively invariant after the deflection at about t45
gives us the basis for labeling this an inelastic,
plastic deformation of the model’s structure
(although one has to be very careful in extracting
such a conclusion from the confounding effects of
the numerical implementation of the RPE
algorithm; Beck et al, [2002b]). Think of this
metaphor as follows. As the frame of the model’s
structure is subjected to the stresses induced, over
time, by the loads arising from the mismatches
between the hypothetical and empirical
experiences of the real system, strains develop in
the constituent members (hypotheses) of the
model. Depending upon the material properties of
these members (the levels of confidence attaching
to the hypotheses), collapse may occur. Testing the
model to the point of such explicit failure in its
particular members is entirely the purpose of this
challenge. We do not want to be left simply with
the crude insight that the model — as a whole — is
inadequate.

Consider once again Figure 1. This, figuratively, is
what is being attempted here: as the template of
the model’s structure is projected through the
space of empirical experience of the real system,
which constituent members of its frame — within
what we think we know and within what we know
we may not know — suffer distortion as a
consequence
of
inconsistencies
between
hypothetical and empirical knowledge? For this we
must mobilize the ideas prized open from the
innovations representation of equation 2,
implementing them through what is known as a
Recursive Prediction Error (RPE) algorithm
[Stigter, 1997; Stigter and Beck, 2002]. Our
purpose is to test the worth not only of this
solution procedure, but also of the above
challenge, in this instance against a set of data
from the River Cam in eastern England [Beck et al,
2002b].
Figure 5 is the outcome, where what is shown are
the reconstructed changes with time, ..., α̂ 0(tk-1),
α̂ 0(tk), α̂ 0(tk+1), ..., and ..., κˆ 0(tk-1), κˆ 0(tk),
κˆ 0(tk+1), ..., in elements of both α and κ. The truth
of the matter cannot be known in this instance, yet
it is obvious from Figure 5(c) that something in the
{acknowledged unknown} becomes significant at
around t45, as κ1 abruptly assumes a non-zero
value. Or it might be said that at this time the basis
for the model’s projection of immediate future
behavior (one sampling interval ahead) veers from
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Figure 5. Reconstructed recursive estimates of
three parameters in a candidate model for the
assimilation of easily degradable organic matter in
the River Cam: (a) parameter α 20 (day-1); (b)

parameter α 30 (gm-3day-1); and (c) gain matrix
element

κ 10

(dimensionless).
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Figure 6. Pre-emptive projections into the future for the Cam case study: (a) using a model structure and
candidate parameterisations ( α i0 ) reconciled with (identified from) the most recent set of (past) data for the

period t24 to t35; and (b) using a more refined structure (parameterized as α i1 ) that seeks to characterize the
path by which the system came to be in its present state at t35. Heavy, continuous lines represent projections
based on a “best” candidate parameterization; thin, continuous lines are the envelopes of minimum and
maximum projected values; and observations are indicated as +.
5.5

consequences of their further growth within
B(t+).

Design for Discovery of Ignorance

But what would we do, if we imagined ourselves
in a present defined by something like t35 in Figure
5, with all the dislocation, if not surprise, in the
behavior of the system still to come? Would we
have the audacity (let alone the method), to ask the
following. Is there any possibility whatsoever of
detecting the onset of apparent structural change –
in the domain of a model’s parametric space –
before it manifests itself more palpably at the
macroscopic level of the conventionally observed
state variables? And if such change were
detectable, could we entertain any hope of
exploring the forecast consequences of
propagating these seeds of change and dislocation
into the future? Let us first state these challenges
more formally as this:
Given a model of fixed structure [f 0,h0], given
the parameterizations of the {presumed known
(α)}, and given descriptions of behavior over
time B(t-), reconstruct the path of variations in
α(t-), in order to identify the seeds of structural
change in B(t-), thus to explore the
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What we need, from the past up to the present, is a
mode of exploration — a combination of the
vehicle and radar in the metaphor used earlier to
explain Figure 1 — deliberately designed for
discovery of our ignorance, and at the earliest
possible moment. In other words, the manner in
which the hypothetical science base is to be
assembled into [f 0,h0], is done to that end.
We have not embarked on any such design as yet.
We have, however, brought to bear all our ad hoc
forensic methods of searching for the seeds of
structural change [Chen and Beck, 2002] on the
foregoing case study of the River Cam, with this
result. Standing at about t35 in Figure 5, we have
found that the behavior of water quality in the
River Cam is subject to the workings of an
unknown process, of potentially growing
significance; that this something must generate
both oxygen and easily degradable organic matter;
and that its conjectured workings are in some way
correlated with a declining streamflow and
significant excursions of water temperature about

some nominal level (as possible input stimulae).
Henceforth, the futures of Figure 6 are
computable, under two subtly, but significantly
different,
conditions
(and
some
strong
assumptions).9 In this paler setting of our rather
audacious challenge, nevertheless, there is
significance. The projections of Figure 6(a) over t+,
i.e., for t≥ t36, which are not successful, have been
generated using the most recent image of the
candidate parameterization of the model at t35, i.e.,
α̂ 0(t35). Those of Figure 6(b), which are more
successful, are drawn from a revised, more refined,
structure of the model [f 1,h1], based on a diagnosis
and synthesis of the prior, accumulating forensic
evidence of the “something untoward” being
apprehended. They are therefore conditional upon
the
attaching
more
refined
candidate
parameterization, α1(t35), as though this α1 is a
(hopefully) invariant parameterization of the
parametric change discovered in α0(t) (up to t35)
[Jakeman et al, 1994; Kokkonen and Jakeman,
2002]. Structure ([f 1,h1]), in short, embraces a
hypothetical explanation of the path by which
behavior — as perceived through the less refined
(prior) structure ([f 0,h0]) — has evolved from the
past (at t0) up to the present (t35). The difference is
as between knowledge of the instant (the present)
and knowledge of how we came to be in that
present.
5.6

Inclined to Survive

This last challenge has to do with the following:
Given a low-order model (LOM) of fixed
structure [f -n,h-n], and given access to a
description of behavior over a short window of
time B(t-), determine the extent to which access
to B(t-) changes the probability of reaching a
terminal pattern of behavior B(t++++).
Because the associated case study deals with the
fate of populations of certain small rodents in the
vicinity of Chernobyl, in the Ukraine, the intent of
the challenge can be confused with determining
the probability of the extinction of a species in a
particular locale. As before, the words we use —
“extinction”, “survival”, “collapse” [Kryazhimskii
and Beck, 2002] — can cause difficulties. What
we are about is this. Given a binary split of
behavior in the future, for example, as between
behavior being “essentially similar to” and

9

We must assume foreknowledge of the ensuing,
observed, future, input stimulae, u(t+); the
foresight for which we struggle is always dogged
by some such limitation.
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“radically different from” that of the past,10 are
either of those future target domains more
reachable, given the empirical record of the past
relative to the maximally uninformed position of
having no access whatsoever to such records? Put
another away, given the tiny windows of empirical
evidence typically available to us, in
contemplating the unfolding of environmental
problems with time constants significantly longer
than the span of the window, can something
meaningful be said of the entire mosaic, having
observed the nature of just a single tile or two?
Given the supposed, hypothetical trajectory of the
system through time, does any observed
inclination in the vicinity of the present, cause us
to conclude that survival (or collapse, or whatever)
is more or less likely than would otherwise be the
case? If the likelihood is changed significantly as a
result of access to the small window of empirical
evidence,
all
the
gross
uncertainty
notwithstanding, then the seeds of embarkation
upon a path to the imagined future may be buried,
and therefore deliberately to be sought after,
somewhere in this evidence.
The method employed in response to this
challenge takes its lead from the binary
classification of behavior, compresses all the
hypothetical knowledge of the science rather
drastically into a (binary-valued) path-dependent
stochastic process (the model [f -n,h-n]), and
acknowledges substantial uncertainty in the
parameterization of the model. In other words, it is
accepted that the probability (r) of the next state
transition being deemed “negative” (in the sense of
an untoward current change in population status)
and the threshold (β) of quantitative change in
population size over any interval, above which the
transition is so deemed, are parameters subject to
wide ranges of possibilities. In the spaces of Figure
7, vertical axis w is the ratio of the conditional
probability of reaching the “collapse” domain (C)
in the future, i.e., p{C(t++++)|B(t-)}, divided by the
unconditional probability, i.e., p{C(t++++)}, given
no access to the small window of empirical
evidence. The surface represents the values of w
resulting from all the various combinations of
candidate parameterizations [r,β], so that where
that surface rises above the plane of w = 1.0, some
inclination to collapse in signaled.
Figure 7 juxtaposes two outcomes of the analysis
[Kryazhimskii and Beck, 2002]. For Figure 7(a),
the window of evidence spans just the two years of
10

Which is clearly a concept underlying all of the
conceptual development (from Hornberger and
Spear, 1980) culminating in many of the foregoing
challenges.

annual observations for1981/2 and 1982/3, while
that for Figure 7(b) spans the four years of 1981/2,
1982/3, 1983/4, 1984/5. It is apparent how access
to the broader window enhances the probability of
coming to the view that the system (of rodent
populations) was destined to enter a collapse state
in the longer term (beyond 1986) prior to the
Chernobyl accident (of 1986). The surface of
Figure 7(b) is subject to a more widespread
upheaval above the plane of w = 1.0 than that of
Figure 7(a). Having contemplated thus the
approach of the system to a distant future state,
should we thereby be provoked into re-examining
the record of the past in a different light?

Figure 7. “Collapse indicator” surfaces for
projections of future outcomes for a rodent
population in the vicinity of Chernobyl: (a) given
access to observed population levels for 1981/2
and 1982/3; and (b) given access to observed
population levels for 1981/2, 1982/3, 1983/4, and
1984/5.
6.

CONCLUSIONS

It will not have escaped notice that this paper has
been written as a synopsis of a recently published
book [Beck, 2002]. Conspicuous by its absence
from that book was a reasonably all-encompassing
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case study, which that described above of Lake
Lanier in Georgia, USA, has become (and not
especially by design). All this “foresight” should
be “foresight for action”. Does that mean we have
fashioned a better framework for action? Not
really, for the recursive, predictive framework at
the core of the formal procedures of this paper
(epitomized in equation 2) is merely another
expression of adaptive management and control
[Holling, 1978; Åström and Wittenmark, 1989].
And it is hard — very hard in fact — to better
these concepts, although we have tentatively
suggested embedding them in a somewhat broader
framework we have called “adaptive community
learning”, as a result of the experience of the
Lanier case study [Beck et al, 2002c].
When the Science Advisory Board of the US
Environmental Protection Agency called for the
means to generate environmental foresight
[Science Advisory Board, 1995], it expected
largely the following kind of response: an area is
to be identified in which scientific data are sparse
and/or in conflict and the scientist conducting the
enquiry is to submit — to the process of scientific
peer review — an opinion on the interpretation of
the data as portending some threat to the
environment. In other words, the extant historical
record gathered within the paradigm of (normal)
scientific enquiry is to be examined and interpreted
by a practising scientist whose opinion will be
judged by other practising scientists. Put
cryptically, such a foresight-generating framework
taps into the combination of {scientific empirical
observations & scientific opinion}. Worthy and
necessary though this is, it is not the only thing
that could be done. Cast in like terms, our
procedure of adaptive community learning — as
now defined and as encompassing an alternative
line of enquiry [Beck et al, 2002c] — draws upon
a combination of {scientific models & stakeholder
imagination}. It differs in both elements from that
of {scientific empirical observations & scientific
opinion}, offering thus a wider search for the
possibility of surprises and being undoubtedly
eclectic, if unconventional, in the sources of
information into which it taps. It has about it a
whiff of the public directing upon which issues the
torchlight of scientific enquiry is to be shone. In
this scheme of things, someone — and someone
essentially other than those mobilizing the science
base into the computational model — is imagining
the future, not predicting it. In the process of
exploring the reachability of this imagined target
future, and the implications thereof, assurance of
quality is needed in the dimension of judging
whether the model has been well or ill designed
with respect to the task, in particular, of

discovering our ignorance at the earliest possible
moment.
So it is, therefore, that in a paper about “foresight”
almost no mention has been made of “prediction”.
For a paper addressing so obviously the future,
fundamentally within the framework of
computational models, it is perhaps just as
surprising that the word “validation” — or
evaluation [Oreskes, 1998], or quality assurance
[Beck and Chen, 2000], or quality assistance
[Risbey et al, 2002] — has barely surfaced, if at
all. Directing a model at the goal of “design for
discovery of ignorance” has only just arisen, as far
as we are aware; judging the quality of the process
of going about this purpose remains, therefore, an
open question. This notion of mobilizing models as
vehicles of exploration, furthermore, shifts
attention away from the arguably more familiar
idea of piling on empirical assessment after
empirical assessment in order (eventually) to
converge upon the invariance of the (unknowable)
truth in the structure of the model.
In many ways, what has been set out in this paper,
as a program for coping with structural change
while generating environmental foresight, can be
cast comfortably within the “participatory, inverse
approach” to problem-solving that would
constitute a Sustainability Science [Kates et al,
2001]. Unquestionably the origins of any advances
that have been made across the paper have been
steeped in the discussion of what has been called
Post Normal Science [Funtowicz and Ravetz,
1990; 1993]. These advances have their reflections
in the works of Robinson [1988] and Kieken
[2002], for example.
The focus was once on analyzing uncertainties
presumed to be reducible (in the end) in a world
view of “constancy” [Beck, 1987]. Attention
herein has been channeled into an outlook of a
more fluid kind: onto a problematique in which the
science base is itself evolving as much as are the
hopes and the fears of the lay community for their
cherished pieces of the environment, on which our
close scientific scrutiny is to be trained.
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